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Abstract: This article seeks to analyze the weight and effects of the Western 
gaze (France’s in particular) in Tolstoy’s own life experience, and how it 
affected his literary production. The psychology of stigma provides some 
interesting insights as to how French opinions about Russia may have 
affected Tolstoy’s identity as a Russian, thus conditioning his choice of 
“identities” for the characters of some of his novels (for example, that of 
Pierre Bezukhov in War and Peace).
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Resumo: Esse artigo procura analisar o peso e os efeitos do olhar ocidental 
(o francês, em particular) na experiência de vida de Tolstói, e como sua 
produção literária foi afetada. A psicologia do estigma fornece alguns 
insights interessantes sobre como as opiniões francesas a respeito da Rússia 
podem ter afetado a identidade russa de Tolstói, desse modo condicionando 
sua escolha de “identidades” para os personagens de alguns de seus 
romances (por exemplo, o de Pierre Bezukhov em Guerra e Paz).
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War and Peace, Love and Hate: as it is well known, Tolstoy’s 
narrative and political ideas are symbolically organized in fundamental 
dichotomies, which become visible in the very titles he gave to some 
of his works. This binary thinking often appears in his writings in the 
form of an initial situation marked by contradictions, anxieties and/
or injustices (be it Russia’s present, or the life of one of his characters), 
which may somehow lead to another situation of reconciliation, inner 
tranquility, and/or social cohesion. Both his main political essays 
and his better known novels are really about proposing possible 
paths from the former to the latter. As many commentators of his 
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works have noted, this intention was not only aimed at finding ways 
out of the social turmoil of his times, but also at reaching that state 
of internal peace that Tolstoy’s tormented soul needed so badly. I 
would like to analyze here some issues of national identity in the way 
Tolstoy envisioned this “reconciliation”. Particularly, I am interested 
in understanding why Tolstoy used France and things French so often 
when he wanted to talk about a situation of lack of unity/inner peace 
that needed to be resolved (and, conversely, used Russia and things 
Russian to bring about that resolution).
Hints of this use of things French can be found in many of 
Tolstoy’s works, from Levin’s disapproval of Dolly’s “antinatural” 
way of speaking (in French) to her own daughter in Anna Karenina, 
to the many indications of a similar obsession for that language 
(or even for speaking Russian with a French accent) whenever he 
wanted to denote lack of sincerity in some of the characters of War 
and Peace (Figes, 2006, 151-52). But the best example is probably the 
famous episode of the encounter of Pierre Bezukhov and Platon 
Karataev in War and Peace. Pierre was a young aristocrat looking for 
authenticity and a sense of purpose in his life, like many Russians 
of his generation. Tolstoy used this character to symbolize the 
alienation of the Westernized elite with regards to Russia: Pierre 
was educated abroad; his very name was French. In addition, to 
emphasize his weak roots as a person, Tolstoy makes him a bastard 
son of a prominent count of the times of Catherine II. While in prison, 
Pierre learns about the execution of other prisoners, and he falls in a 
deep state of desperation and loss of faith. But then he meets Platon, 
another fellow prisoner who was, unlike him, an authentic Russian 
peasant. By being exposed to his deep religious faith and his typically 
“Russian” sense of community (which contrasted to the aristocrat’s 
individualism), and by listening to his simple words, Pierre finally 
experiences a sort of spiritual regeneration. Through this contact 
with the quintessential values of Russianness, Pierre finally becomes 
reconciled with himself and finds a way to a meaningful life (Tolstoy, 
1966, I, pp. 1389-94 and 1496). In Tolstoy’s novel, the background of 
this story of personal regeneration is that of the defeat of the French 
armies, accomplished by the common effort of all Russians, finally 
fighting as a united nation.
This use of things French (bad) as opposed to things Russian 
(good) could easily be interpreted as simple “nationalism”, a typical 
19th-century Russian quest for national authenticity and improvement 
in the situation of the narod. However, it appears to me that there is 
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more to be explored in this notable juxtaposition of nation, class and 
culture (“French”/upper/elite in the case of Pierre; Russian/lower/
peasant in Platon) in the way the author presents his dichotomy. I will 
argue that, to some extent, this story of “reconciliation” by getting 
more in touch with things Russian (and conversely, by removing 
oneself from the “French” customs) can be interpreted also as an 
intellectual strategy to deal with the author’s own wounded identity 
as Russian. For Tolstoy’s sense of personal identity, like that of many 
19th-century Russian intelligenty, was deeply affected by the gaze of the 
French “other”. Let me explain myself.
I would like to argue that the normative pretension of the 
narrative of Western “civilization” –that is, the implicit and explicit 
regulation of what is “good” or “bad”– is bound to affect the self-
perception of non-Westerners. The evidence of the subaltern role 
assigned in that narrative to the other nations, and their failure to 
measure up with the implicit norm of good (“civilized”) society, is 
very likely to condition the formation of their identities in a negative 
way, by introducing elements of frustration, anxiety, shame, guilt, 
and self-deprecation. And if this applies to any non-Western nation, 
it is especially so in the case of Russia. For my recent book Euro-
orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France, c. 1740-
1880, I have carried out a comprehensive study of perceptions of 
Russia in France, from c. 1740 to c. 1880. In the period of my research, 
the narrative of Western identity made extensive use of Russia as an 
other through which to delineate itself. At least in nineteenth-century 
France, Russia was constantly and insistently depicted as Asiatic, 
barbarous, despotic, imitative, brutal, and void of all the elements 
that characterize civilization. As far as I know, similar stereotypes 
were also continuously repeated in Britain, Germany, and other 
countries. The amount of such deprecatory allusions is such, that 
one may confidently call it cultural harassment. And it is important 
to note that it was not just anyone’s views, but the gaze of the very 
nations that were supposed to embody the norm of civilization 
(sometimes even expressed in the works of the most authoritative 
and admired writers of the time: Rousseau, Diderot, Ségur, de Pradt, 
Custine, Hugo, Tocqueville, Michelet, Saint-Marc Girardin, etc.). The 
feeling of European “superiority” rested, to a large extent, on the 
construction of the other’s “inferiority”.1 Undoubtedly, this sense of 
superiority helped not only to foster European identity, but also (as 
in self-fulfilled prophecies) to make that superiority “real”. But how 
can we assess the impact of this cultural harassment in the making of 
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Russian identity? What was the effect of the gaze of the “civilized” 
other on Russians? 
In thinking through this issue, I found that the psychology and 
sociology of stigma might provide useful insights on the reactions of 
Russian culture to French/Western cultural harassment. The effect of 
stigmatization on the identity and psychology of racial minorities and 
other marginalized social groups –disabled, diseased, gays, women, 
unemployed, poor people, and certain “dishonorable” professions– 
has been the subject of numerous studies. Scholars have found that 
stigmatization usually “involves dehumanization, threat, aversion, 
and sometimes the depersonalization of others into stereotypic 
caricatures”, which can manifest itself from passive, seemingly 
“harmless” ways to the most violent forms (Dovidio et al., pp. 1-30, 
1). Stigmatizing the other may serve a number of purposes, including 
fostering one’s own sense of self-esteem, dominating or excluding 
other groups, finding a scapegoat to channel social anxieties, 
controlling certain resources, and reinforcing social identities and/
or hierarchies (Idem, p. 7). Charles Stangor and Christian Crandall 
have studied a particular type of stigmatization, directed against 
those who endanger “the belief in a just world”. Social order relies on 
the premise that the world is more or less fair for everybody. So, in 
order to protect this belief, factual evidence pointing to the opposite 
conclusion must be neutralized, by blaming the unfortunate for his 
or her own misfortune. Thus, for example, instead of considering that 
poverty constitutes a regrettable fact of an unfair world, it is explained 
by the “laziness” or “lack of intelligence” of the poor. In that way, the 
stigma becomes the revelation of the character or “essence” of the 
stigmatized, and the belief in a just world is thus maintained. Not 
surprisingly, scientific surveys have shown that those who have a 
strong “social dominance orientation” –that is, those who approve of 
strong hierarchies and social inequality– are more likely to stigmatize 
others.2 The ideological function of the narrative of civilization, 
and the implicit subalternization of the non-Western other, may be 
analyzed in this light as a form of stigmatization. 
But we are interested here in the possible effects on the subjectivity 
of the stigmatized. Scholars agree that stigma affects the formation of 
identity in a strong way. Stigmatized individuals, for example, tend 
to suffer from lack of self-esteem. Studies disagree on the level or 
continuousness of this affliction, but it is clear that the self-esteem 
and self-confidence of stigmatized individuals is damaged at least 
in some social situations.3 Stigmatized individuals may also suffer 
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from “stress” or “minority stress”, meaning a situation in which the 
“environmental demands, internal demands, or both tax or exceed 
the adaptive resources of an individual”; this kind of stress may 
seriously affect behavior and emotions.4 Stigmatized individuals 
often “internalize” the values conveyed in the stigmatizing regard 
of the other. This may result in self-hatred and victimization, 
“various patterns of withdrawal and defensiveness, passivity, in-
group hostility and identification with the oppressors, as well as 
seriously impaired self-esteem”. In sum, stigmatization may produce 
a “devaluation of identity” 5 or even a “spoiled identity”, which in 
turn may turn stigma into a self-fulfilling prophecy –the stigmatized 
ends up behaving in the way the prejudiced stereotypes presuppose.6 
However, different individuals and groups may respond 
differently and develop strategies to deal with stigma without fully 
internalizing it, or at least avoiding its most destructive consequences. 
Indeed, loss of self-esteem and the rest of the negative effects related to 
stigma do not follow automatically from stigmatization. For example, 
scientific surveys of racial minorities show that, in some occasions, 
the perception of the social discrimination they suffer as a group 
may be used to protect the individual’s self-esteem, for any personal 
failure or problem may be blamed on the discriminating others or “the 
system”.7 Similarly, as Derek Walsgrove has demonstrated, whilst 
most long-term unemployed tend to end up depressed, blaming 
themselves for their misfortune and “fantasizing the normal”, in 
some cases they may find alternative narratives that enable them to 
elude that fate –for example, by embracing a radical ideology that 
puts the “blame” in “the system”, or “the bourgeoisie”.8 
Can we find comparable effects of, and/or strategies to deal 
with (Western) stigmatization in Russian culture? As is well known, 
from at least the eighteenth century well into the twentieth century 
the Russian elite was educated in French; indeed, it was common 
practice to speak mostly French among educated Russians. Still in 
1876 Dostoevsky found it necessary to mock at that custom, without 
much expectations to change it –as he acknowledged, that kind of 
criticism was by then already a cliché.9 The extent to which Russians 
were aware of, and paid attention to Western Russica –particularly of 
French origin– in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is also well 
known.10 The reactions to Rousseau’s criticism of Peter the Great in 
authors such Aleksandr Radishchev or Nikolai Karamzin have also 
been documented11 and, in general, scholars agree that comparisons 
with “the West” were fundamental in the making of Russian culture 
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and identity.12 I believe that the weight of the Western gaze is utterly 
present in Russian culture, and its effects on Russian identity cannot 
but be profound. Signs of its presence can be found in many Russian 
sources.13 For example, in 1797 Karamzin described the “feeling of 
inferiority” and “humiliation” that Russians suffered when Peter 
the Great opened his “window on the West”.14 Similarly, in 1821 
the writer and friend of Pushkin Wilhelm Karlovich Küchelbecker 
accused that Emperor of having strengthened serfdom just as he 
made Russia known to the rest of Europe: “he exposed us to the sight 
of all Europe”.15 Many more examples can be found in nineteenth-
century literature; to mention but one example, the rather amusing 
episode recalled in Turgeniev’s Smoke (1867), when a Russian man 
sitting at a restaurant in Paris plunged in “desperation” and “shame” 
when he realized that he had ordered food in perfect French, but still 
not quite in the style in use at that time.16 As it is well known, this 
implicit violence and devaluation of identity that the internalization 
of stigma produces appear with particular clarity in the first of the 
Philosophical Letters, written (in French) in 1829 by Pëtr Chaadaev, 
which in turn unleashed the bitter controversy between Slavophiles 
and Westernizers that marked nineteenth-century Russian culture.17  
There is another aspect of the theory of stigma, usually called 
“downward social comparison” or “downward stigmatization”, that 
I find useful for the understanding of Russian culture. As Erving 
Goffman and others have demonstrated, stigmatized individuals 
often tend to stratify the members of their own stigmatized group 
according to the degree to which their stigma is apparent. By means 
of this stratification, the less evidently stigmatized may behave like 
the “normals” with regards to the more obviously stigmatized. Thus, 
they reproduce and reinforce stigma whilst projecting onto the others 
the characteristics that are usually the cause of self-deprecation. In 
that way, self-hatred turns into hatred for the (more) stigmatized. This 
feeling can be even stronger than the contempt the “normals” develop 
for the stigmatized, as their self-esteem is under a stronger threat. For 
example, Derek Walsgrove has shown that young unemployed of a 
highly skilled or middle class background are more likely to develop 
more aggressive feelings towards other unemployed of lower class or 
skills, because their “respectability” is more at stake. In addition to 
this, as Goffman has suggested, stigmatized individuals may strive 
to look like the “normals” by acquiring symbols of prestige (that is, the 
opposite to stigma). Downward comparisons may thus be based on the 
stratification of the visible signs of both stigma and prestige.18 
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This theoretical insight may be useful in analyzing the 
effects of stigma on Russian culture, by illuminating the relative 
interchangeability of discriminative labels of race, “culture”, and 
class. Lev Tolstoy’s semi-fictional memoirs Childhood, Adolescence, 
Youth reveal the way in which stigmatization might affect not only 
Russia’s standing vis-à-vis the West, but also the relationship between 
different classes of Russians. Society, Tolstoy argues, “may be divided 
into many categories”. He recalls that, when he was about sixteen 
years old, his
favorite and principal division of people was into those who were comme 
il faut and those who were comme il ne faut pas. The latter I subdivided into 
those not comme il faut, per se, and the common people. I respected those 
who were comme il faut and considered them worthy of consorting with me 
as my equals; the second category I pretended to scorn, though in reality 
I detested them, nourishing a feeling of personal injury against them, as 
it were; the third did not exist for me at all: I despised them utterly. My 
own comme il faut consisted, first and foremost, in being fluent in French, 
particularly in having an impeccable pronunciation. A person who spoke 
French with an accent at once inspired in me a feeling of hatred. “Why do 
you wish to speak as we do when you cannot?” I would mentally inquire of 
him with biting irony. 
The other conditions of being comme il faut, for the young Tolstoy, 
were “the appearance of one’s fingernails” (these had to be “long, 
well-kept and clean”), to know “how to bow, dance and converse 
properly”, to show “indifference to everything and a perpetual air of 
elegant and supercilious ennui”, and also other exterior signs such 
as furniture, carriages, or clothing. As Tolstoy sadly recognizes, this 
stratification of people meant that he felt “hatred and contempt” 
towards “nine-tenths of the human race”, and believed in the idea 
that the comme il faut were “superior to the greater part of humanity”. 
A subtle observer of human behavior, Tolstoy remembers the 
permanent, daily pains he would go through in trying to be comme il 
faut, and concludes by saying:
How odd that I, who was positively incapable of being comme il faut, should 
have been so obsessed by this conception. But perhaps it took such strong 
hold of me for the very reason that it demanded a tremendous effort on my 
part to acquire this same comme il faut.19
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Tolstoy’s remarks allow us to visualize the overlapping of categories of 
race (or in this case, properly speaking, “nationality”), culture, and class, 
and the management of the violence implicit in stigma. For the young 
Tolstoy, being “superior” meant at the same time being “more French” 
(or “less Russian”), mastering “high” culture and “cultured” manners, 
and owning the necessary wealth to acquire the proper symbols of status. 
Thus, in his symbolic organization of society, being poor, uncultivated, 
or completely “Russian” all meant more or less the same thing. 
The overlapping of hierarchies of “culture”, manners, and 
wealth is typical of the process of civilization, as Norbert Elias has 
demonstrated in his classic study.20 In the example we are analyzing, 
however, there is an additional element: race. Civilization in Russia 
–at least, in Tolstoy’s experience– meant the development of the 
apparatus of self-restraint, the acquisition of higher culture and a 
proper degree of wealth, and the ability to dissimulate or repress 
at least some of the elements of one’s own race or “nation”. The 
concealment of, or withdrawal from, the awkward evidences of the 
“natural” world typical of the process of civilization everywhere else, 
also meant for Tolstoy the dissimulation of his Russianness and the 
willingness to adopt the “normal” nationality. At the age of sixteen, 
Tolstoy had already internalized both the stigma implicit in, and the 
standards of “good” society projected by, the narrative of Western 
civilization. For Tolstoy, as for Russia, being comme il faut meant 
ceasing to be what they were.   
It is interesting to note how Tolstoy would manage his own 
stigma and the anxieties of his wounded identity by channeling 
downwards the violence he was subject to. The reassurance of his own 
self-esteem would rely on the deprecation and deep hatred of those 
perceived as “inferior” –not only the lower classes, but also those who 
were more “Russian” than he. As Tolstoy recognizes, these almost 
unmanageable feelings seriously affected his potential relationships 
with “nine-tenths” of the population. 
This brief incursion into Tolstoy’s life experience and into the 
problems of his wounded identity as a Russian under the gaze of the 
“civilized” Master, may help us better understand the frequent use of 
fantasies of “reconciliation” with his own Russianness which, like the 
story of Pierre Bezukhov, also involves “social reunification” with the 
lower classes. I do not imply by this that there was anything “fake” 
in Tolstoy’s commitment to social change and to the poor, but rather 
that his own identity was also involved in this political choice.  
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